ATA Testimony by EVP and COO John Meenan Before House Homeland Security Subcommittee On Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on the critical issues associated with aviation security "watch lists."

Commercial aviation helps drive more than 10M American jobs and 5 cents of every dollar of U.S. GDP
Commercial aviation drives more than $1 trillion per year in economic activity
In 2012, U.S. airlines moved more than 48,000 tons of cargo per day
In 2012, the value of a kilogram of U.S. merchandise exported by air averaged 121 times the value exported by sea
For every 100 airline jobs, some 360 are supported outside of the airline industry
Federal taxes constitute $61 – or 20% – of the price of a typical $300 domestic round-trip ticket
In 2011, U.S. airlines carried 16 percent more passengers and cargo using 10 percent less fuel than in 2000
Domestically, airlines drive 5% of economic activity but account for 2% of man-made GHG emissions
From 2000-2011, airlines reduced GHG emissions by 11% while transporting 16% more passengers and cargo
From 1975-2011, U.S. airlines and their partners reduced significant noise exposure by 99%
Commercial air travel is the safest form of intercity transportation in the United States
In the most recent decade, scheduled air service on U.S. airlines was seven times safer than in the 1970s
From 2000-2012, U.S. airlines improved the on-time arrival rate from 72.6% to 81.9%
From 2000-2012, U.S. airlines reduced the flight cancellation rate sharply from 3.30% to 1.29%
Airfares are a bargain: From 2000-2012, U.S. CPI rose 33% while average domestic fare rose just 13%
Adjusted for inflation, the average round-trip domestic airfare fell 15% from 2000
2007 domestic flight delays cost the United States approximately $31 billion
In 2012, the value of U.S. merchandise exported by air reached an all-time high of $427B
In 2012, U.S. exports of air-travel services reached an all-time high of $39.5B, driving a $5.1B trade surplus
In 2012, U.S. passenger and cargo airlines spent more than $50B on fuel, averaging 36% of operating expenses
In 2012, U.S. airlines posted the lowest annual rate of mishandled baggage ever recorded
FAA projects U.S. air travel demand to top 1 billion passengers in 2027
In 2012, US airlines flew 83.4 million passengers in scheduled international service - a record high
In 2012, the total value of merchandise exported from or imported to the United States by air exceeded $927 billion
In 2012, 7.15 teragrams of merchandise was exported from or imported to the United States by air

	ATA Testimony by EVP and COO John Meenan Before House Homeland Security Subcommittee On Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on the critical issues associated with aviation security "watch lists."
	PubZone1 September 9, 2008 Thank you, Madame Chairman. The Air Transport Association and its member airlines welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the critical issues associated with aviation security “watch lists.” In order to provide the committee with a complete picture, it may be helpful to begin with a chronology of the lists during the past seven years. In October 2001, prior to the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued the first “watch list” (containing a handful of names) of individuals identified by the FBI. These individuals were not to be allowed to board flights. Late in 2001, the list was divided by Security Directive into separate “No-Fly” and “Selectee” components. As the name implies, No-Fly listees were not to be permitted to board while selectees were to be subject to additional screening. Carrier requests for scripts as to what these individuals should be told were declined, first by the FAA and later by TSA. As the lists began to grow in 2002 and 2003, carriers were devoting more and more manpower to this effort. Consequently, many carriers began investing significant resources in information system modifications to automate this process. Two relevant asides are worth mention: The carriers were required to use their best judgement in designing those systems, incorporating name variability programs to be certain they found similar names - but without government guidance or standards. Looking back, problems really began to compound themselves at this point when, absent government engagement, carriers began to develop highly variable systems, capabilities and procedures. Point two, let me be frank: Due to the economics of the airline industry, the legacy information systems we are working with, while reliable, are cumbersome and expensive to modify. They are generally old technology, which adds complexity to the situation. While many carriers would, no doubt, welcome new systems, economic realities control new investment decisions. In 2003, many carriers went to work to develop "preclearance systems" - essentially reviewing each days anticipated passenger lists against the government's lists, and pre-resolving any matches to the greatest extent possible. One carrier had approximately 35 full-time employees engaged in this process. As a result, carriers incorporated their frequent flyer lists (which provided more detailed identification information) and therefore helped resolve uncertainties. These lists, of course, are highly proprietary and, as a result , being a frequent flyer on one carrier does not help clear a passenger traveling on another airline. Throughout 2002 and 2003, TSA indicated that its Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening program (CAPPS II) was moving forward and would soon replace the carrier programs with a TSA risk-assessment and passenger-authentication program. As 2003 moved on to 2004, CAPPS II remained a promise. At the same time, TSA began modifying procedures and list formats, usually without industry consultation, resulting in frequent and redundant reprogramming in order to enable the loading of the modified lists. By 2004, CAPPS II had morphed into the newly promised Secure Flight – and TSA’s renewed commitment to take over the watch-list matching function. The carriers have made every effort to support this initiative, noting only their concern that Secure Flight be thoroughly vetted and tested to avoid further complications. Throughout this period, the lists had continued to grow – the No Fly and Selectee lists alone exceeded 145,000 names. Added to that, we now have a so-called “cleared list,” which TSA developed to respond to passengers who had been inconvenienced. Unfortunately again, with wide variations among carrier’ processing capabilities, passenger delays were inevitable. Given of the absence of TSA/industry consultation, the investments to develop robust carrier preclearance systems, the cleared list are next to useless. Over the past seven years we have worked with no fewer than five – TSA CAPPS II/Secure Flight program directors. Carriers have, as for 2007 (the last time we updated the data) spent some $44 million maintaining, developing and operating screening systems. (We acknowledge this figure is imprecise, since these expenses are not tracked more closely.) We have participated in numerous teleconferences and provided personnel for literally dozens of meeting with the TSA, particularly seeking to advance first, CAPPS II, and then Secure Flight. I am pleased to report that in recent months, TSA and airlines have been working closely to further reduce the number of passengers misidentified through the Watch List process. We know this is a difficult assignment for the TSA and for the airlines – and we are committed to ensuring that it is effective. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA have now provided more detailed guidance as to functional system requirements; carriers have been authorized to incorporate date of birth information into their records to help address misidentifications; carriers have also redoubled their efforts to encourage customers to join their frequent flyer programs – which, for the most part, provides the optimal use of existing technology to avoid misidentification; TSA has provided a script for carrier use to advise passengers why they may not be able to check in on line or at a kiosk. Taken together these initiatives should help to further reduce passenger inconvenience. We know too that TSA plans to begin to roll out Secure Flight, which may ultimately resolve the problem of watch list misidentification by early 2009. We are fully supportive of this effort – subject only to the caveat that it be fully vetted prior to implementation to assure that passenger pre-screening is truly improved. We urge this committee’s full and active engagement in the development and deployment of Secure Flight and thank you for the opportunity to appear today. PubZone2	A4A advocates measures to support aviation safety, security and well-being.